Memory strategies mediate the relationships between memory and judgment

In the literature, the nature of the relationships between memory processes and summary evaluations is still a debate. According to some theoretical approaches (e.g., “two-memory hypothesis”; Anderson, 1989) retrospective evaluations are based on the impression formed while attending to the to-be assessed stimuli (on-line judgment) – no functional dependence between information retrieval and judgment is implied. Conversely, several theories entail that judgment must depend, at least in part, on memory processes (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Schwarz, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The present study contributes to this debate by addressing two important issues. First, it shows how more comprehensive memory measures than those used previously (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986) are necessary in order to detect a relationship between memory and retrospective evaluations. Secondly, it demonstrates how memory strategies influence the relationship between memory and judgment. Participants recalled lists of words, after having assessed each of them for their pleasantness. Results showed a clear association between memory and judgment, which was mediated by the individual strategies participants used to recall the items

Preference reversal: Memory and contextual biases with choice

A virtue of good theory is that it is general; theories that predict a wide range of events have obvious merit. Several promi- nent theories of decision making achieve this objective by proposing that all decisions can be modeled with the same generic representation (e.g., Birnbaum, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; von Neumann & Mor- genstern, 1947). For example, these theories assume that all decisions under risk or uncertainty can be represented as gambles, with monetary amounts representing the outcomes. In five experiments, we pursue an opposing, not previously investigated idea: Risky choices are affected by decision content, even when utilities and probabilities are known. We studied the influences of context (Experiments 1 and 2), memory (Experiments 3 and 4) and computational complexity (Experiment 5). In contrast with traditional theories, we find that people do not have un- derlying generic preferences; people’s experiences “leak” into decisions even when risk information is explicitly provided

An effect of semantic memory on immediate memory in the visual domain

The present study extends the findings of Hemmer and Steyvers (2009a) by investigating the influence of semantic memory on short-term visual memory. In an experiment we tested how prior knowledge moderates serial position effects, using familiar (vegetables) and non-familiar stimuli (random shapes). Participants (Ps) saw lists of six images; each list held images of vegetables or random shapes. Immediately after list presentation, one of the items was presented again, in a new, randomly determined size. Ps were asked to resize the image so that it was as close as possible to the size of the just presented item. Results showed that, for the familiar items (vegetables), memory for the item’s size was supported by prior knowledge of the normal size of the objects; this was not the case for the random shapes. Moreover, there was a stronger serial position effect for random shapes than vegetables suggesting that for the serial positions where memory is typically lowest, the serial position effect was moderated through the support from long-term knowledge

Now I like it, now I don’t

The present paper tests the widely accepted hypothesis that on-line judgment implies functional independence between memory for, and judgment of, verbal stimuli (e.g., Anderson,1989; Hastie & Park, 1986). In the present study, participants recalled lists of words, after having assessed each for its pleasantness. Presentation position of a negative item within the lists was manipulated. Also, items memorability was manipulated after their presentation – by inserting a filled delay between presentation and the judgment task; in this way, on-line judgment formation was spared. The memory manipulation reduced recall rates for negative items presented in the last position – and their negative influence on pleasantness ratings accordingly. These results contradict the predictions of pure on-line approaches to judgment formation(e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001) and suggest that even in on-line judgment tasks, memory plays a role

Reconstructing the recent visual past: Hierarchical knowledge-based effects in visual working memory

This paper presents two experiments that examine the influence of multiple levels of knowledge on visual working memory (VWM). Experiment 1 focused on memory for faces. Faces were selected from continua that were constructed by morphing two face photographs in 100 steps; half of the continua morphed a famous face into an unfamiliar one, while the other half used two unfamiliar faces. Participants studied six sequentially presented faces each from a different continuum, and at test they had to locate one of these within its continuum. Experiment 2 examined immediate memory for object sizes. On each trial, six images were shown; these were either all vegetables or all random shapes. Immediately after each list, one item was presented again, in a new random size, and participants reproduced its studied size. Results suggested that two levels of knowledge influenced VWM. First, there was an overall central-tendency bias whereby items were remembered as being closer to the overall average or central tokens (averaged across items and trials) than they actually were. Second, when object knowledge was available for the to-be-remembered items (i.e., famous face or typical size of a vegetable) a further bias was introduced in responses

Raising argument strength using negative evidence: A constraint on models of induction

Both intuitively, and according to similarity-based theories of induction, relevant evidence raises argument strength when it is positive and lowers it when it is negative. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that argument strength can actually increase when negative evidence is introduced. Two kinds of argument were compared through forced choice or sequential evaluation: single positive arguments (e.g., “Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain; therefore, Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain”) and double mixed arguments (e.g., “Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain, X’s music DOES NOT; therefore, Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain”). Negative evidence in the second premise lowered credence when it applied to an item X from the same subcategory (e.g., Haydn) and raised it when it applied to a different subcategory (e.g., AC/DC). The results constitute a new constraint on models of induction

Robot-Assisted Epiretinal Membrane Peeling: A Prospective Assessment of Pre- and Intra-Operative Times and of Surgeons' Subjective Perceptions.

PURPOSE The Preceyes Surgical System (PSS) is a robotic assistive device that may enhance surgical precision. This study assessed pre- and intra-operative times and surgeons' perceptions of robot-assisted epiretinal membrane peeling (RA-MP). METHODS We analyzed the time requirement of three main tasks: the preparation of the PSS (I), patient preparation (II), and surgery (III). Following surgery, the surgeons were asked questions about their experience. RESULTS RA-MP was performed in nine eyes of nine patients. Task I required an average time of 12.3 min, initially taking 15 min but decreasing to 6 min in the last surgery. Task II showed a mean time of 47.2 (range of 36-65) min. Task III had a mean time of 72.4 (range of 57-100) min. A mean time of 27.9 (range of 9-46) min was necessary for RA-MP. The responses to the questionnaire revealed a trend towards increasing ease and reduced stress as familiarity with the PSS increased. CONCLUSIONS A substantial reduction in pre- and intra-operative times, decreasing to a total of 115 min, was demonstrated. RA-MP was positively anticipated by the surgeons and led to no hand or arm strain while being more complex than manual MP

Reconstructing the recent visual past: Hierarchica lknowledge-based effects in visual working memory

This paper presents two experiments that examine the influence of multiple levels of knowledge on visual working memory (VWM). Experiment 1 focused on memory for faces. Faces were selected from continua that were constructed by morphing two face photographs in 100 steps; half of the continua morphed a famous face into an unfamiliar one, while the other half used two unfamiliar faces. Participants studied six sequentially presented faces each from a different continuum, and at test they had to locate one of these within its continuum. Experiment 2 examined immediate memory for object sizes. On each trial, six images were shown; these were either all vegetables or all random shapes. Immediately after each list, one item was presented again, in a new random size, and participants reproduced its studied size. Results suggested that two levels of knowledge influenced VWM. First, there was an overall central-tendency bias whereby items were remembered as being closer to the overall average or central tokens (averaged across items and trials) than they actually were. Second, when object knowledge was available for the to-be-remembered items (i.e., famous face or typical size of a vegetable) a further bias was introduced in responses. The results extend the findings of Hemmer and Steyvers (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 80–87, 2009a) from episodic memory to VWM and contribute to the growing literature which illustrates the complexity and flexibility of the representations subtending VWM performance (e.g., Bae, Olkkonen, Allred, & Flombaum, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(4):744–63, 2015)